

**WORKSHOP ON
ENVIRONMENTAL REQUIREMENTS
FOR INDUSTRIAL PERMITTING**

REFERENCEGUIDE

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INTRODUCTION

A number of OECD Member countries apply both technology-based requirements (“BAT” either as limitations derived from technology assessment or application of **specific technologies**) for pollution sources and **environmental quality objectives/standards (“EQO”)** in regulating **pollutants**. **Early** use of the concept of **assimilative capacity** was widely **regarded** as an excuse for pollution. **Several factors** are now cause for governments to look **again** at **environmental** carrying capacity as a necessary aspect of management: better tools for measurement and risk **evaluation**, **regional-scale** and diffuse-source pollution **problems** to be **solved**, cost-effectiveness issues **and** improved environmental **enforcement** capacity. **Technology-based** requirements have been **demonstrably** effective in reducing the pollution burden; however, **as** these requirements become more **stringent** (approaching 100% removal), **concerns about costs** increase. The impact of **such** requirements on innovation and pollution prevention continues to be **argued**.

Understanding these and other implications requires a **much** better **knowledge** of how Member governments **actually** set and use BAT requirements. As part of **its** programme of work on advancing Member government effectiveness in environmental **strategies**, the Pollution Prevention and Control Group (PPCG) of **the** OECD **has** conducted a **policy** study of regulatory **approaches** for controlling pollution, focusing on the relationship of technology-based “BAT” requirements **and** environmental quality **objectives/standards**.

As an **integral** part of the PPCG’s project on environmental requirements for **industrial permitting**, the **laws, regulations, policies** and practices of some Member **and** Observer countries have been surveyed. The survey **focused** on those countries that chose to participate in the case studies on environmental permitting **that** were **conducted** in four industrial **sectors** (pulp **and** paper, **oil** refining, metal finishing, iron and steel). The **salient** features of these country **policies** have been **summarized** into the **present reference** guide which serves as a background document for the case Studies **and** the workshop on **industrial** permitting held by the OECD on 9-11 **May** 1996. In **the** guide, **each** descriptive section is supplemented by a flow-diagram that **provides** a schematic interpretation of the legislative, regulatory and administrative processes **leading** to the adoption of technology-based **and/or** environmental quality standards in the permits granted to **industrial** sources of pollution.

The survey of country **policies** performed in this **reference** guide **provides** some analytical groundwork. It **reveals** that BAT **approaches** and EQS **approaches** **coexist** in most Member countries. **The** concepts of technology-based standards **and** environmental quality standards **may be** interpreted and applied in different **manners** in **the various** surveyed countries. However, in spite of the different **approaches** used, environmental aspirations are roughly similar throughout the studied group of countries.

Technology-based and **environment-based** regulations **exist** in **all** the surveyed countries. However, in some of these countries (most notably Korea **and** Japan, to a lesser extent the Scandinavian countries), regulatory requirements are often a **baseline** that is expected to be exceeded through **various mechanisms** involving industry and the government. **Voluntary agreements** to go beyond the government-imposed **emission** limit values are **very** important in **Japan** and **Korea**.

Best available technology criteria almost **never** mandate **the use of a particular technology**. Instead, they are **couched** in terms of performance requirements (on emissions and effluents, waste generation, **energy** or materials used, recycling contents, for instance). However, the performance requirements are typically **based** on a review of the technologies commercially available throughout the world at the time of the review. Frequently, the mandated performances **can** be attained only by the particular technology used as a **basis** for the review, which, in the final **analysis**, **may** amount to prescribing a particular technology. Here lies the crucial importance of **the conditions applied to the implementation of the requirements**, principally the deadline for compliance. Technological **innovation may be** induced or thwarted by flexibility on **these** points. **Since** it **may** be interpreted in **very** different **manners**, BAT **may** indeed **provide** the needed flexibility.

With the exception of economic feasibility, two major **considerations** weigh on **the** final permitting requirements for industry. Both entail **benefits** and shortcomings.

The technological approach makes it **easier** to know and control which substances are emitted to the environment. Technological requirements, however, **may lock** the regulated **industrial** processes into some predetermined technological **trajectory**. In addition, technological requirements **may** be isolated from the reality of the local environmental conditions. Environmental problems **may** be **over-** or understated. On **the other hand**, domestic efforts and **competition** in this **area may lead** to success in know-how that would not have **been** reached otherwise. Also, the technological approach **may** be the most appropriate way to take into **account** long-range transboundary pollution problems. The **benefit** of **the** BAT concept is **that** new and better **reference emission** limit values are continuously sought, even at the international level.

The environmental quality approach is more closely linked to **the** reality of local conditions. **The “critical load”** concept is of increasing **interest** in a number of countries. However, **the** **complexity** of ecosystems **and pollutant paths** is **such that decisions may** be **cloaked** in a **significant** amount of uncertainty. In addition, **the** link between information on **actual** environmental **quality on the one hand**, and **emission/discharge** performance requirements on the other hand **may** be uncertain. It **can** be **trial-and-error**, it **can** be computer simulation, it **can** be both.

The environmental quality approach deviates from the BAT **principle** when the volume or **flow** of the receiving environment, e.g. **the** receiving water body, is **very** big. Dilution and pointing at other sources **may** be a way **out** for some sources. In the case of **small and diffuse** sources, **EQOs may** be ineffective as **policy** instruments; **incentives** for applying control **measures may** be weak and supervision **may** be difficult. **EQOs** for **particles** and noise for instance **may** be breached by automobile **traffic** in **many** densely built-up **areas and** methods for **enforcement may** be lacking or weakly implemented. Coercive **means** are **difficult** to use when culprits cannot be pointed **out**. In addition, point sources **affected** by **EQOs may** use the **attainment status** of the **area** in which they operate to argue **against** further pollution control measures .

The central question is therefore **the** following: **can the two approaches** (BAT and EQO) be designed so as to be mutually reinforcing?

For what **concerns** **BAT-based** policies, two **broad approaches can** be identified in member countries. On **the one** hand are the countries where technology requirements are embodied at **the** most upstream stage of the **decision-making** process and in **very explicit** and **precise** terms. In **this** context, the regulatory, permitting **and enforcement** authorities have a more limited discretion **and** their actions are **scrutinized** by other branches of governments **and/or any aggrieved party**. Deviations **from the** defined

mandate are often settled in courts. The United States is the prime example of **such** a legalistic system. **On the other** hand are countries (most of the OECD) where discretion on the part of **the** regulatory authorities is the norm. In these countries, technology requirements are either absent from legislation (Japan, Korea) or broadly **defined** (Europe), which leaves **much** latitude to the downstream authorities but also to the permit applicants, principally in the permitting negotiations. In some of those countries, technical instructions (TI) impose technical requirements that are absolutely binding for **permitting** authorities. **TIs** therefore have **the** same impact on licensing **procedures** as legislative requirements.

In principle, **economic considerations** are mostly irrelevant in **the** development and **enforcement** of environmental quality standards and objectives, particularly those that are health and ecosystem-based. However, they are a more relevant **factor** in the determination of technology-based **emission** limit values. **Yet** the **methodologies** for determining the **economic** acceptability of a requirement are either non-existent or so general that **decisions** are in **fact taken** on a case-by-case basis. Some general **principles may** apply. For instance, **regulatory/permitting** authorities **may** be willing to consider broad economic efficiency criteria (**cost-benefit** analysis, **principles** of reasonableness and **proportionality**) but refuse to consider the **specific** cash-flow situation of a particular **facility** or company. It is more problematic to apply BAT to **small and medium-size enterprises**. For **this** however, most countries have threshold **sizes** for the sources to which **technological** requirements are mandated to be applied. Nevertheless, it appears **that** more work is needed to develop **tools** for economic assessment of measures in **the** framework of environmental permitting.